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Introduction
An enormous reduction of transportation costs and barriers to trade and capital fueled a lively debate about potential risks of job losses triggered by a reallocation of home production to low-cost countries. At odds with many canonical trade studies, policy makers often emphasized those risks in order to defend protectionist tendencies within a country. Hence, the widespread belief that globalization is responsible for massive job destruction could in principal also explain the recent surge in protectionism as observed in countries like Brazil, China, or the U.S.. Instead of withdrawing from trade, governments could also decide to react to heightened pressure on the labor markets by improving institutional measures in order to compensate workers from potential job or income losses. To what extent changes in institutions feedback through the product market by reducing the respective country's competitiveness within certain industries is however not yet fully understood.
In his seminal paper, Davis (1998) stressed the importance of institutions, which are crucial for the explanation of different labor market patterns in countries that are internationally interdependent. In line with Davis (1998) , Egger, Greenaway, and Seidel (2011) distinguish between the long-and short-run effects of capital mobility in their theoretical and empirical analysis of labor market rigidities and its effects on the share of intra-industry trade measured by a bilateral Grubel-Loyd index. Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler (2009) show that bad institutions in one country negatively spillover to labor market outcomes in their trading partners. My contribution to the literature is to develop a model that allows to assess how unilateral changes in labor market institutions affect labor markets not only in the respective but also the integrated countries. The outcome of the model differs in that it can explain skill-specific institutional changes, as well as skill-specific effects due to the assumption of heterogeneous workers along the lines proposed by Hanson (1996, 1997 ) and Moore and Ranjan (2005) . Moreover, the model employed in this paper is able to explain an observable reversing trend in Chinese foreign direct investment. The implications drawn from the comparative static exercise in this paper suggest a two-way relationship with wages being jointly determined by labor market institutions and international trade. It will be shown that trade and FDI affects labor demand at both the intensive and extensive margin. At the extensive industry margin countries imposing institutional changes by improving unemployment benefits, the workers position during wage negotiations, or the recruitment process indirectly influence a country's comparative advantage within a certain range of industries, thereby affecting aggregate labor demand and unemployment. The impact of such an industry-reallocation at the extensive margin magnifies the effects at the intensive margin, where wages directly trigger responses of withinindustry labor demand. The assumption that high-and low-skill workers are complements leads to inter-skill spillover effects within a country. Moreover, better labor market institutions protecting the workers render foreign direct investment more attractive.
This magnification effect holds irrespective of the complementarity assumption, imposed to keep the model tractable. Applied to the model, recent improvements in the Chinese security system and workers' labor rights can explain the aforementioned reversing trend in capital flows into China, where the rapid opening up to global markets was accompanied by massive capital inflows and a strengthening of Chinese firms in the 80s and 90s. Increasing wages due to improving labor standards likely contributed to the massive capital outflows observed during the last decade. 1 The model itself is based on Schmerer (2011) , where search frictions were already introduced into a Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) trade model but without distinguishing between skill-specific unemployment rates. The predictions about the foreign direct investment and unemployment nexus derived from the model were tested using OECD data on unemployment, labor market institutions, and foreign direct investment. The model proposed in this paper is tied closer to the original Hanson (1996, 1997 ) approach due to the distinction between low-and high-skill workers, which facilitates an analysis of skill-specific institutional spillover effects. A government can influence wages and unemployment of the low-skilled by manipulating labor market institutions concerning high-skill workers only. It will be shown that this reduces the position of high-skilled workers, while low-skilled benefit from rising wages and employment through the feedback effects at the intensive-and extensive-margin. 3 Closely related to this paper is for instance Beissinger (2001) , who studies spillover effects of unilateral labor market reforms on capital flows between two countries. Boulhol (2009) focuses on the pressure of trade liberalization on labor market deregulations. Lin and Wang (2008) Matusz (1988, 2004) 
The benchmark model
The product market equilibrium is characterized by a two-stage production process: fi- 
5 where x(z) denotes the amount of intermediate goods demanded from industry z and ϕ(z) is industry z's Cobb Douglas consumption share. 3 The aggregate consumption good is produced without costs and sold for an aggregate price level P . Prices and wages are jointly determined by upstream producers, workers, and downstream producers. Aggregate demand for the final output good equals total expenditure Y P = E.
The aggregate demand function (1) implies that a constant fraction ϕ(z) of world expenditure is spent on the consumption of good z. Thus, consumer demand for output generated in industry z reads as
so that the share of expenditure spent for that particular industry z is equal to the revenue generated in the respective industry. Perfect competition implies that total revenue in industry z is equal to the quantity produced, x(z), times unit costs, κ(z). One can solve the standard utility maximization problem of the representative consumer who maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint, which depends upon prices, consumption, and income available for consumption. The first order condition of the utility maximization problem yields equation (2) .
Final consumption goods producers. We borrow the heterogeneous worker concept from Hanson (1996, 1997) by assuming that goods are produced in a continuum of industries using the input factors capital, high-, and low-skill workers. However, the model setup is different in that workers are not directly used by the final output good producers, instead those final goods are produced using intermediates obtained from small firms hiring either low-or high skill workers. The input coefficients that determine labor requirements for the production in z are given exogenously. 4 Goods in the continuum are ranked according to their skill intensities a h (z) and a l (z), both described by linear functions increasing in z. The assumption that the input coefficient curves that pin down low-and high-skill labor requirement are both steeper in the foreign country than in the home country give rise to gains from trade and determine the free trade pattern that stems from cross-country differences in production costs. It is worth mentioning that technology plays a minor role in this setup since the results are not driven by differences in endowments or technology. Countries produce goods where they have a comparative advantage by means of lower unit costs compared to the unit costs in the competing country. However, it is sensible to link the input requirement curves to relative factor endowments so that, on average, low-skill abundant countries have a relatively higher low-skill labor demand in all industries. In the following all countries are assumed to be low-skill abundant and all industries therefore have higher low-skill requirement on average. 5 The functional form of both input coefficient curves is
where i is the country identifier, l denotes low-, and h denotes high-skill. For the input coefficients we assume that α is a country-specific constant and γ denotes the industry specific component of labor requirement depending on z. Similar to Hanson (1996, 1997) the final intermediate good is assembled according to the nested Leontief production function
Input over high-and low-skill intermediates is assumed to be Leontief, which implies 
Downstream producer prices equal production costs depending on the firm's input coefficients, wages earned by workers that produce the intermediates for the upstream producers, and search cost paid by upstream producers in order to recruit workers.
Goods are ordered according to their relative skill intensity. We know that intermediate good prices are equalized over the whole continuum. This implies that the unit cost ranking of industries solely depends on the input coefficients, which are exogenously given and increasing in z. Wages in both countries are equalized across sectors z but not across skill groups. Each firm has to pay q h for high-skill intermediate goods and q L for low-skill intermediates. Intermediate goods' prices are taken as given in the final production stage and set in the stage below where firms use high-and low-skill labor to produce the intermediates. Downstream producers adjust their labor demand with respect to prices charged by upstream producers. Perfect competition implies that the industry price level equals the respective industry unit costs
where
and κ(z) denotes minimum unit costs in sector z obtained by solving the standard cost minimization problem for firms producing according to the production function (5) .
Intermediate input producers. Firms in this final stage use labor to produce intermediate input goods. There are two different type of firms, one producing high-skill intermediates by input of high-skill labor, and one producing low-skill intermediates by input of low-skill labor. This assumption is consistent with the notion of firms producing different parts with different skill requirements in separated plants. The number of potential firms is given by L i and H i since each intermediate goods producer employs one worker, and since demand for high-and low-skill intermediates is dictated by the Leontief production function (5) in the downstream production process. However, search frictions reduce the number of firms since some of the workers are unemployed. 6 Labor markets are not perfect. Employers and employees have to be matched to each other and firms have to post vacancies before hiring workers. Bargaining between firms and workers is separated according to the workers' skills without intra firm bargaining across skills. However, there is an interaction between high-and low-skill workers since upstream producers take downstream retail prices into consideration when negotiating wages. Equation (5) implies that there is no substitution between high-and low-skill workers since both inputs are used in a certain relation. Thus, firms' revenue is zero if bargaining with one or the other type of worker fails. Even if the relation in the production process is different, their importance for the revenue generated is equal since the real amount of both input factors is equal in production. Factors with higher input coefficients are more productive and therefore less units are used. Given that the price for the intermediate good depends on wages paid by upstream producers, labor market clearing hinges on a certain pair of equilibrium market tightness to secure that revenue generated by the downstream producers is exactly equal to κ i (z)x i (z).
Properties of the labor market equilibrium condition.
Since the latter product market equilibrium depends on the labor market equilibrium more clarification is needed (1) is easily proved by deriving the first derivative of the labor market equilibrium condition with respect to θ k , which is increasing since the vacancy filling rate is decreasing in the equilibrium market tightness ∂m(θ k ) ∂θ k < 0. Thus the first derivative of (8) and (9) with respect to θ k is positive.
Solving the product and labor market equilibrium pins down the low-and high-skill equilibrium market tightness and unemployment in both countries via the skill-specific Beveridge curves
.
The Beveridge curve relates the unemployment-to-vacancy ratio such that the flow into unemployment equals the flow out of unemployment and therefore pins down longrun equilibrium unemployment rates in the economy. The Beveridge curve is convex due to the concave matching technology. Thus, the magnitude of the relationship between θ k and u is stronger for relatively low values of unemployment.
Labor market clearing
The Using Shephards Lemma we know that demand for intermediates produced is equal
Domestic labor market equilibrium requires that labor demand at the aggregate level is equal to total labor supply which is satisfied if
and
holds. The right hand side is aggregate labor demand obtained by aggregating industry level labor demand over all industries depending on input prices following (11) . The (2) and equation (7) in order to link the aggregate demand, labor-, and product-market equilibrium via
Thus, the number of matches equals the number of intermediate goods available. The consumption share for each industry z is constant and by assumption equalized over the whole continuum. In the continuous scenario the mass of one single industry is close to zero. It is thus necessary to compute the mass of a certain range of industries within the whole continuum. To understand the implications of the assumption made above we compare the continuous scenario with the discrete scenario. Suppose n, the number of goods produced, is large and each industry has the same constant Cobb Douglas expenditure share ϕ, which is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the whole continuum of industries. This would allow us to approximate ϕ(z) = 1/n. 7 The approximation in the continuous case is similar but here we need the notion of a mass of industries over the range z andz. A solution to the integral is determined by sub- 7 As in the continuous case, the consumption share of one particular industry goes to zero if n is large. stitution and integration by parts. We define f k (z) = a k (z) and g (z) = (q l (θ l )a l (z) + q h (θ h )a h (z)) −1 to obtain a solution for (14) and (15) as
For the foreign country we obtain Proof. Let Γ L denote the left-, and Γ R the right hand side of the labor market clearing condition. We further define f k (z) =
The left hand side of both labor market clearing conditions has its origin at zero and converges to an upper bound.
The right hand side is also well behaved. Labor demand is decreasing in θ k . An increase in θ k triggers an increase in intermediate input good prices, which in turn reduces de-mand for intermediates. Applying the Leibniz rule to the right hand side of the labor market clearing condition and assuming that the bounds of the integral being constant
where world income is set as nummeraire so that E = 1. 8 The first derivative approaches 0 when q k goes to infinity and ∂ 2 Γ R ∂q 2 k > 0. Therefore, firms' labor demand is decreasing in θ k and converges to zero. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium. Notice, that there is an interaction between the low-and high-skill labor market clearing condition.
The high-skill labor market tightness shifts low-skill labor demand Γ R through the increase in the wage rate that enters both group's labor market clearing condition.
Labor demand Γ Rh
Labor demand Γ Rl 8 Note that this normalization helps to solve some ambiguities. However, as shown later on world income does not change by much due to some countervailing effects of FDI on both countries' wages. 13 both skill sectors. The focus lies on the interaction between equilibrium market tightness θ k and labor demand / supply. For the sake of clarity we assume that the labor supply function Γ L are equal in both sectors. 9 A change in one skill group's equilibrium market tightness also affects the respectively other skill-groups Γ R . The equilibrium is unique since Γ L has its origin at zero and converges to the upper bound whereas Γ L converges to zero when θ k goes to infinity. This shift in unit costs over the whole continuum will result in a loss of the comparative advantage in some industries located close to the former cutoff, resulting in a shift of z * .
General Equilibrium
To close the model we still have to determine world income and capital returns. Income is not normalized to unity and equals world factor payments
The capital rental is determined exploiting the Cobb Douglas shares and Shephards Lemma again
Thus, the fraction ζ is spend for intermediates which gives us
Both equilibrium conditions can be solves for E in order to derive
The equilibrium thus depends on 8 endogenous variables: 4 equilibrium market tightness, capital return in the foreign and home country, one cutoff, as well as world in-come. We follow Hanson (1996, 1997) setting world income as nummeraire so that we can drop one equilibrium condition as suggested by Walras' law.
Comparative statics
We now turn to the comparative statics of the model and analyze how labor market institutional changes trigger foreign direct investments. Second, the effects of a unilateral change in labor market institutions on unemployment in both countries are analyzed.
Interest rates are treated as exogenous. An increase in unemployment benefits for instance shifts the unit cost schedule upwards, followed by adjustments at the extensive margin. Capital has to flow between the two economies in order to restore equilibrium since interest rates are fixed and equalized across countries.
The distinction between high-and low-skill labor allows us to disentangle the effects according to skill. Institutional reforms always affect skill-specific unemployment in both the low-and the high-skill group directly through the wage setting mechanism and/or indirectly through the adjustments at the extensive margin. Put differently, improvements in the bargaining power of the low-skilled workers at Home directly affect their wages and thus unemployment of the low-skilled only. Beyond that, wages and unemployment of all workers at home and abroad are affected through trade and FDI.
Changes in labor market institutions
Extending the Feenstra and Hanson (1996) i. Adjustment at the extensive margin further reduces labor demand since all jobs connected to those industries get lost in the home country. The destruction of industries also lead to excess capital supply in country i, which will be shifted to countries suffering from excess capital demand due to the enhanced production. In country i = j adjustments take place at the extensive margin only since interest rates do not change.
The receiving country's unit cost schedule therefore remains constant. However, since production expands in the receiving country, labor demand goes up, accompanied by an increased labor supply. A higher wage rate is needed to trigger an increase in labor supply. Therefore, the new equilibrium requires a higher market tightness in both skill sectors to satisfy the increase in labor demand. Proof. a) follows directly by ∂w ki ∂b i > 0 or ∂w ki ∂β i > 0 where we assume that the labor market institutions across high-and low-skill sectors are equal. Therefore, unit costs in all industries rise and labor is substituted with capital. Labor supply Γ li must go down in both skill sectors, since labor demand ∂Γ ri ∂q hi < 0 and ∂Γ ri ∂q li < 0. Again we first assume that the cutoff remains constant. At the extensive margin, we know that the unit cost schedule shifts upwards in country i followed by adjustments in the cutoff. The adjustments at the extensive margin are already derived for the prove of proposition (3). For country i = j the capital inflow and the expansion of its production to additional industries boosts labor demand and thus reduces unemployment, even if labor market institutions in that country remain unchanged. Again, a formal proof is already provided for proposition (3) . To analyze how capital changes in the aftermath of institutional reforms we have to introduce capital market clearing conditions by aggregating individual industry demand for capital as
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On the aggregate level capital demand is pinned down by
which is found by aggregating individual industry capital demand (25) due to ∂l h ∂q h < 0. Moreover, high-and low-skill workers are compliments. Institutional changes that are intended to affect high-skill workers also affect demand for intermediates produced by low-skill workers due to ∂l l ∂q h < 0. A second effect stems from the adjustments at the extensive margin, where the increase in z * through the shift of the unit cost schedule increases aggregate labor demand, thereby magnifying the positive employment effects. The additional demand for capital can be satisfied through foreign direct investments from abroad. Capital owners abroad are willing to invest due to excess supply of capital as some industries are reallocated at the extensive margin.
Unemployment in the foreign country must rise in both skill groups as the economy contracts. Figure (2) illustrates the comparative static exercise for the case of a reduction in domestic high-skill unemployment benefits. At the intensive margin, within-industry labor demand has increased for both skill groups, which shifts the aggregate labor demand curves Γ Rl and Γ Rh upwards. As already mentioned, institutions do not affect labor supply so that Γ L remains unchanged. To satisfy the increased labor demand unemployment must decrease in both sectors as illustrated by the rise in both skill groups equilibrium market tightness from θ to θ . Effects at the extensive margin are illustrated in Figure (3) . A reduction in the skillspecific unemployment benefits reduces labor costs over the whole continuum of industries so that κ(z) is lower as well, illustrated by a downward shift of the domestic unit cost schedule. The initial specialization pattern is not optimal any more and must readjust. Domestic production expands and foreign production contracts so that the new intersection of the domestic and the foreign unit cost schedule is such that z * > z * .
Equilibrium Market Tightness θ
It follows from Proposition 4 that the reallocation of industries from Foreign to Home rises aggregate labor demand at Home but reduces aggregate labor demand at Foreign so that skill-specific unemployment rates decrease further, whereas skill-specific un-employment in Foreign is increasing for both types of skill.
Figure 3: Skill-specific institutional spillover effects
At the extensive margin this shift in the specialization pattern due to the increased cutoff z * affects wages and unemployment according to Proposition 4. In the scenario sketched above the domestic economy benefits from the labor market reform, whereas the foreign economy looses due to contraction of the foreign economy. Again, to countervail the decreased labor demand at the extensive margin, unemployment must rise, accompanied by lower equilibrium market tightness and lower wages.
Conclusion
In a nutshell, this paper's main contribution is to extend the Hanson (1996, 1997 Job Creation J k in (27) denotes the present discounted value of expected profits from an occupied job in skill group k, V k in (28) denotes the value of a vacant job in skill group k, and η denotes the exogenously given discount rate. 11 The value of a vacant job negatively depends on unit recruitment costs, but increases in the difference between the value of the filled job and the opportunity costs given by the value of the vacant job.
The matching function itself pins down the probability of a successful match due to the assumption of constant returns to scale. The flow value of the filled job is revenue generated by the worker minus the wage rate paid to the worker. 12 Job separation due to an exogenous shock hits the firm with poisson arrival rate λ and destroys the value associated with that firm, which reads as
In equilibrium the value of unoccupied jobs is zero since firms continue to post vacancies until all profits are exploited
We can combine (28) and (29) in order to obtain the Job Creation condition under perfect competition with search frictions as In that particular case the value of the job becomes zero and the worker receives her outside option worth ηU k . Unemployed workers receive some unemployment benefits b and with a certain probability they successfully find a new job in another firm, which translates into
We follow Dutt et al. (2009) and introduce W e k in order to take into account that workers are randomly matched to firms and therefore have to build expectations about W . This also implies that all firms pay the same wage rate and therefore only differ with respect to production. Wages itself are bargained and satisfy the bargaining condition
Thus the distribution of total gains depends on both actors' bargaining power, which implies
We obtain a wage condition by combining the equilibrium conditions (35) and (34) as shown in the Appendix to solve for
which is the pendant to the labor supply curve in the standard Hanson (1996, 1997) model.
Equilibrium in the high-skill intermediate sector.
In equilibrium, the wage and the equilibrium market tightness θ k are determined by interacting the wage curve and the job creation curve such that
Simplifying then yields (29) and (28) are combined so that
which can be rearranged to equation (30). To solve for the wage curve we start with rearranging equation (33) as
Equation (28) can be rewritten as
Expanding equation (31) by substracting (η + λ)U k on both sides gives
A solution for the outside option is obtained by combining equation (32), equation (41), and equation (29) as
Combining equation (44), (41), (42), and (45) gives
To solve for the equilibrium intermediate good price we can interact the wage curve (36) and the job creation curve (30) and solve for k (z)
Derivation of the LMC curve. We know that firms' demand for intermediate goods is given by equation (11) . Aggregating low-skill labor demand over all industries and equating aggregate labor demand and supply yields
where we can use (2) to substitute out x(z) and (7) to solve for (12) or (14) 
where we use = q ld (θ l )a ld (z) + q hd (θ h )a hd (z) and (z) = q l (θ l )Γ l + q h (θ h )γ h . The second integral is solved by substitution so that we obtain equation (16) which is needed to derive ∂Γ R ∂θ k < 0. It is enough to apply the Leibniz rule on Γ R in order to derive
− ζϕ(z)E(a k (z)) 2 [q l a l (z) + q h a h (z)] 2 dz < 0 (55) which implies that ∂Γ R ∂θ k < 0. To derive this proof the assumption that the upper and the lower bound remain constant was made. The intermediate good price for the other skill group is also implicitly assumed constant and optimal. However, there is an interaction between both skill groups. A change in the price of the other intermediate good shifts 30 the regarded labor demand curve Γ R . Therefore, given the upper and lower bounds of z there exists exactly one combination for both market tightness for which both skill group's LMC curves are jointly satisfied. (4) . Part a) follows immediately by deriving the first derivative of Γ R with respect to z * . Notice, that for each country we ex-ante know whether z * is the upper or lower bound. In the two country scenario both countries have one constant bound (either 0 or 1) and one variable bound z * . So it is important to determine whether z * is the upper or lower bound for each country, which depends on the regarded country's comparative advantage. For the moment we assume that home has a comparative advantage in the production of goods closer to 1 and foreign has a comparative advantage in the production of goods closer to 0. For the home country z * is therefore the lower bound of active industries. Changing the bounds and deriving the first derivative with respect to z * therefore yields ∂Γ R ∂z * = − a kd (z * )ϕ(z * )E q ld a ld (z * ) + q hd a hd (z * ) < 0 (56)
Proof of Proposition
for Home and respectively ∂Γ R ∂z * = a kf (z * )ϕ(z * )E q lf a lf (z * ) + q hd a hf (z * ) > 0 (57)
for Foreign. An increase in the cutoff industry thus reduces labor demand at the extensive margin due to a reduction in active industries. Part b) follows from the assumption made about relative skill endowments and technology that a h > a l and c) is also straightforward.
Proof of Proposition (6) and (7) . The first derivative of the ETC curve with respect to b is ∂q k ∂b k = (1 − β) The cutoff changes exactly as already described for the increase in the capital rental, so that Γ R and Γ L have to adjust accordingly. See the proof for Proposition 4 for more details.
